2. the -foreign-country discovery provisions of-Proposed Rule 26(a)(5), suggested by the Advisory Committee but deleted by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure; 7 and 3. the foreign-country depositions provisions of Proposed Rule 28(b), originally tied to the Rule 4 proposals of 1989, which have gone forward to the Supreme Court for possible approval. 8 The central theme of this article is the development of exceptions in the Rules of Civil Procedure and federal statutes that apply only to litigants outside the United States. The article's thesis is that the Rules should not make exceptions on a blanket basis, as some recent proposals would have it. Congress, not the Supreme Court, should be the agent for change in this sensitive area of litigation, so potentially charged with foreign policy implications.
Part II of the analysis that follows considers the jurisprudential uncertainties present in all U.S-based transnational civil litigation. Part III focuses on current examples from civil litigation where procedural norms favor one party over another, for policy reasons, or where all parties have no special dispensation or advantage. Part IV traces the history of proposed amendments, most of them now discarded, to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 26, and 28. Part V recommends that the Rules should not include an automatic advantage to foreign litigants and that any foreign claims for dispensation should be subject to a factor-balancing analysis similar to that articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) , 9 at least until Congress provides further guidance.
II JURISPRUDENTIAL UNDERPINNINGS
The relative uncertainty in transnational litigation and in application of procedural principles and rules to assure fundamental fairness to all parties can be traced to the multilayer, multifactor processes of analysis that are at work in such cases. This section discusses some of the more important factors that may be involved in any case of transnational litigation.
There is no international consensus concerning the relative importance of the various sources of international law. First, although some commentators may accord more or less primacy to one source or another, l° most would say that 7. Id International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 13 That international law is part of U.S. domestic law is well known; Habana's analysis of customary law is also well known. 4 The opportunity for application of customary principles can occur only in the absence of U.S. court precedent, executive proclamation or agreement, congressional legislation, or treaties. U.S. federal and state 5 courts have little opportunity for judicial creativity through custom or general principles of law as compared to courts outside the United States, since they must apply federal statutes, treaties, or executive pronouncements under a later-in-time principle. 16 Federal statutes preempt any federal common law. 17 And although there have been intimations that a later- 97 (1970) STATUTE] , states the formula that must be applied in litigation before the International Court of Justice and which has supplied the traditional mode of analysis; see also supra note 10, particularly RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102-103, which supply variants on the theme. When "state" is used in this article, I refer to entities that are nation-states in the sense of id. § 201. When "State" is used, the reference is to one of the 50 States of the United States.
12. Compare ICJ STATUTE, supra note 11, art. 38, para. 1(d) (listing the first two as secondary sources) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 102 r.n. 1, § 103 (treating all three as "evidence" of the law).
13. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215 (1895) developed custom appearing in U.S. jurisprudence as federal common law can supersede an international agreement, 8 the orthodox view is that treaties are paramount and stand, regardless of their age. 19 Second, there is disagreement concerning the weight that should be afforded to international law relative to municipal (national) law. Many nations observe the dualist theory of international law, under which conflicts between international law and municipal law would be resolved in favor of the latter. Other nations abide by-the monist theory, which holds that international law "as the best available moderator of human affairs" would be supreme over national law. In some situations, the federal system, through rules of procedure, statutes, treaties, decisional law, and occasionally the Constitution itself, has displayed favoritism, by conferring benefits on classes of litigants. In other situations, the federal courts have followed common principles, sometimes stated in procedural rules or statutes or in their application, that are balanced as to all parties concerned. This section discusses policies behind each of these choices. Treaties have also demonstrated favoritism by allowing nations to choose, for example, the preferred methods of service," to deny letters of request for pretrial discovery of documents, 45 and to elect to enforce awards deemed commercial under the law of the ratifying state. ' However, there is a critical difference between the special privileges afforded by treaties and other forms of favoritism. International law recognizes the equality of all states, large and small, 4 7 and all states have an equal opportunity to choose to become party to or to remain outside a treaty network, perhaps with reservations permitted by the agreement. The doctrine of equality is implicit in the balancing process described next.
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B. Indicia of Balancing
In domestic jurisprudence, there are several examples of the balancing of competing interests: for example, the standard of notice in which the cost to the plaintiff is measured against the relative certainty of forms of service," the relative fairness of venue transfer for each of the litigants, 49 and the options for discovery responses."
At the transnational level, some of the same considerations also apply, but in a different context. For example, at least a summary of the complaint in the foreign defendant's language would probably be required for adequate notice under U.S. due process. 1 In addition to the possibility of refusal of the receiving state to enforce a judgment based on a failure of service under U.S. due process standards, there is the further risk that such judgments will not be To be sure, prescriptive jurisdiction also requires at least some territorial nexus, RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § § 402(1)-402(2), but since the initial filing of the suit, as well as its management, is within the territory of the United States or will have effect therein, there seems to be no difficulty with that hurdle. relevant factors" in the case of prescriptive jurisdiction 3 and by discrete tests of minimal reasonableness for adjudicatory jurisdiction.' On the other hand, enforcement jurisdiction is predicated upon initial prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction, qualified by a requirement of reasonable relationship to the laws or regulations to which it is directed, a determination of violation, and the proportionality of the sanction to the gravity of the violation. Extraterritorial enforcement can be imposed if the party has reasonable notice of the matter and opportunity to be heard."
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law approach to prescriptive jurisdiction has not been universally accepted by the courts. 66 Courts and commentators have argued that the judiciary lacks expertise and institutional capacity to assess questions of national interests and foreign relations problems. 67 Others have said there has been an inevitable bias toward U.S.
interests in these cases. ' Others object to the amount of time busy courts must devote to resolving these issues. 69 In support of the Restatement (Third) position, it should be noted that U.S. As previously noted, 72 
A. Rule 4 and Waiver of Service
The 1989 amendments to the Federal Rules included Proposed Rule 4(d), which introduced the concept of waiver of service. 74 Although the rule would not have required that plaintiffs use the waiver of service method, there was a strong cost incentive to employ the method. "Every other defendant... [would have] a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of service of a summons by waiving service in accordance with the rule." 75 Plaintiff would "notify the defendant of the commencement of the action and request that the defendant waive service of a summons.
7 6 The notice and request could be sent "through firstclass mail or other equally reliable means," 77 and would warn of the possibility of imposition of costs for failure to comply with the request absent good cause for such failure. Costs for failure to comply with a request for waiver would have included the costs of conventional service in the United States (or by specified alternatives if service were effected in a foreign country) and "a reasonable attorney's fee, of any motion required to collect such costs. 78 of Canadian corporation where Canadian law forbade production of documents in Canada).
71. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), with its approval of tag jurisdiction for due process purposes-at least insofar as Justice Scalia was concerned-might be a signal that U.S. courts are diverging from the Restatement's internationalist perspective.
Compare The Committee also thought that [b] ecause the waiver would be consensual, the transmission of a request to a foreign country should give no offense even to foreign governments that have withheld their assent to service by mail . . . . Because of the unreliability of some foreign mail services, the longer period of 60 days is provided for a return of a notice and request for waiver sent abroad."
The alternate methods for service in foreign countries were retained in Rule 4 and updated to include the Service Convention where it applied.' These options, however, would have played a subordinate role to the waiver of service provision, which would become the primary vehicle for serving to defendants abroad. Under the present rule, use of the choices set out in Rule 4(i) is a clear option, as long as federal or state law authorizes extraterritorial service. Although Rule 4(i)(1)(D) authorizes service "by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served," if that method is objectionable in the foreign country, the plaintiff can use other options listed in the rule for non-Convention states or get an order of court' directing service under the Convention. The 1989 proposals would have removed this flexibility.
While the amendments were before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Embassy of Great Britain expressed two concerns. First, extraterritorial mailing of requests under proposed or Rule 4(d), coupled with the potential for cost shifting if the requests were declined, would contravene the letter or spirit of the Hague Service Convention. ' Second, at least by omission, the rule appeared to be inconsistent with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 5 with respect to 79 ' In May 1992, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted another version of Rule 4(d), which was substantially similar to the 1989 proposal.' The Committee, after further study, concluded that the potential benefits to litigants-both plaintiffs and defendants-justified use of the request-for-waiver procedure in cases involving foreign defendants. The Committee amended the text of the Rule and the Committee notes, and the proposed new Forms 1A and lB, 8 9 to try to ameliorate concerns expressed by the United Kingdom and the Justice Department. The Committee revision attempted to make clear that the request for waiver of service-"which, in fact, [would] afford ... significant potential benefits" to defendants residing in foreign countries through elimination of costs and time to respond-"is a private, nonjudicial act that does not purport to effect service or constitute any directive from a court. ' The Committee also pointed out that the Committee Notes had addressed the criticism "that declination, pursuant to foreign law, to waive service when requested by mail could result in unfair cost-shifting" by explaining that "costshifting would be inappropriate if a refusal is based upon a policy of the foreign government prohibiting all waivers of service. ' 91 The Committee Notes offered the same justifications but added:
There is no useful purpose achieved by requiring a plaintiff to comply with all the formalities of service in a foreign country, including costs of translation, when suing a defendant manufacturer, fluent in English, whose products are widely distributed in the United States.
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The Notes point out that the new text clarifies some confusion among plaintiffs caused by the old text, which frequently had been interpreted as allowing defendants to effect service by mail unilaterally. "It is more accurate to describe the communication sent to the defendant as a request for a waiver of formal service." ' by waiving service, the defendant can reduce the costs that may ultimately be taxed against it if unsuccessful in the lawsuit, including the sometimes substantial expense of translation that may be wholly unnecessary for defendants fluent in English. Moreover, a foreign defendant that. waives service is afforded substantially more time to defend against the action than if it had been formally. served: under Rule 12, a defendant ordinarily has only twenty days after service in which to file its answer or raise objections by motion, but by signing a waiver it is allowed 90 days after the date the request for waiver was mailed in which to submit its defenses. Because of the additional time needed for mailing and the unreliability of some foreign mail services, a period of 60 days (rather than the thirty days required for domestic transmissions) is provided for a return of a waiver sent to a foreign country.'
The Notes also expressed hope that since transmission of the notice and waiver forms is a private nonjudicial act, does not purport to effect service, and is not accompanied by any summons or directive from a court, use of the new procedure will not offend foreign sovereignties, even those that have withheld their assent to formal service by mail or have objected to the service-bymail provisions of the former Rule.
95
The Notes do not seem to have considered the fact, however, that there would be little difference in appearances, insofar as foreign recipients and foreign governments would be concerned, between receiving an envelope with a waiver of service form attached to the complaint and other papers, and receiving a copy of the complaint by mail, as under Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) or (4) (1991) , which note that NewYork does not require filing of service of the complaint before mail service; a "notice of default" is sufficient. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a), 4(d) compel service of the complaint with the summons, and in actions filed in the federal courts in New York, that procedure must be followed even if out-of-state service is sought under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). Other states allow mail service, perhaps by registered mail with return receipt requested, but a copy of the complaint must accompany the summons. See, e.g., N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)(c), 4(j)(3), 4(j)(4)(a), 4(j)(4)(c), 46)(5), 4(j)(6)(c), 4(j)(7)(a), 40)(8)(c). In these jurisdictions that follow federal rule practice, plaintiff must comply with the registered or certified mail requirements if service is attempted under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(c)(i) or 4(e). The requirement of attaching the complaint to the summons copies the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a), 4(d), which control.
97. Amendments, supra note 4, at 28, 146 F.R.D. at 562.
The only adverse consequence to the foreign defendant is one shared by domestic defendants: the potential imposition of costs of service that a successful defendant would not otherwise have to bear. The Notes add that shifting expense would not be proper under the Rule if a foreign defendant's refusal to waive service was based on a policy of its government prohibiting all waivers of service. 98 This latter confession and avoidance does not seem to consider the problem of a defendant who is not a national of the government in whose territory the waiver of service is effected by mail, for example, a U.S. or other national residing in such a country. The Hague Service Convention makes no distinction among defendants present in a state, which has the option to reject mail service under the Convention. 99 Nor does it take into account the principle that many civil law states that are not Convention parties generally regard service of process-however it might be styled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-as a sovereign act to be performed in their territory only by state officials and in accordance with that state's law. 1°°T he Committee Notes also say that there would be little need to use the waiver of service option in countries like the United Kingdom, which accepts documents in English, and whose Central Authority under the Hague Service Convention acts promptly, and whose policies discourage residents from waiving formal service. 0 1 This, of course, does not take into account the ingenuity (or ignorance) of U.S. lawyers who may decide to use the waiver of service option out of habit or for reasons of economy. Nor does it account for the requirement of many states perhaps exercising their option under the Convention" of requiring translation of court documents in another language. As of early 1993, three nations had exercised that option." 3 The Notes conclude by arguing that the waiver of service procedure offers "significant potential benefits" to a plaintiff when suing a defendant who is fluent in English but who is located in a country where documents must be translated into another language or where formal service will otherwise be costly or time-consuming."° This declaration, of course, squarely overlooks the provisions of the Service Convention, at least with respect to those states that have opted out of mail service or who require translation into a language other than English."°5 One Committee member would have excluded foreign defendants from the request-for-waiver procedure. Despite the majority recommendation, the Committee included this Special Note:
If the Committee's proposal to make the request-for-waiver procedure available with respect to defendants located outside the United States is disapproved, Rule 4 need not be rejected in its entirety. Rather, one of two approaches could be adopted: (1) eliminate the cost-shifting feature that is the principal objection raised by the British Embassy (by adding a clause in the last sentence of Rule 4(d)(2) that excludes foreign defendants from the cost-shifting sanction), or (2) limit the Rule 4(d) procedure to domestic defendants (by eliminating the reference to subdivision (f) in the first sentence of Rule 4(d))."°A fter review by the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference of the United States has chosen to exclude foreign-party litigation (cases where a plaintiff or a defendant are outside the United States) from the costs provisions of the waiver-of-service procedure of Proposed Rule 4(d).
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n litigation involving foreign defendants, an alternative service vehicle will be Proposed Rule 4(f), an update of present Rule 4(i):
Service Upon Individuals in a Foreign Country. Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or an incompetent person, may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; or (2) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice: (A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or (C) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by (i) delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint; or (ii) any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or Besides explicit reference to the Service Convention and the former options preserved in Proposed Rule 4(f)(2), the ambit of the court's discretion in Proposed Rule 4(f)(3) has been qualified to track other international agreements. 109 Thus, Proposed Rule 4(f) would seem to send a conflicting message. First, there is no direct indication of the primacy of the Service Convention as the preferred method by many states. Second, plaintiffs who compare Proposed Rule 4(d) with Proposed Rule 4(f) do not receive any assistance from the text of the Rule as to the place of waiver of service. Those who read the Notes may derive some comfort from them, but these are possibly misleading. The result is the very real risk, articulated by the United Kingdom during the drafting process, that plaintiffs, and therefore the U.S. courts, may inadvertently initiate an offense to the sovereignty of a state, either by violating the Service Convention as applicable to that state, or by offending that state's policies as to mail service in the absence of the Convention. If an applicable treaty or convention provides for discovery in another country, the discovery methods agreed to in such treaty or convention shall be employed; but if discovery conducted by such methods is inadequate or inequitable and additional discovery is not prohibited by the treaty or convention, a party may employ the methods here provided in addition to those provided by such convention or treaty."'
The amendment purported to reflect the policy of accommodation to internationally agreed methods of discovery expressed in the Agrospatiale concurring opinion, according to the Advisory Committee Notes of the 1989 version of the proposed rules. 12 These Notes would have warned:
Attorneys and judges should be cognizant of the adverse consequence for international relations of unduly intrusive discovery methods that offend the sensibilities of those governing other countries ....
If certain methods of discovery have been approved for international use, positive international relations require that these methods be preferred, and that other methods should not be employed if the approved methods are adequate to meet the need of the litigant for timely access to the information." commercial matters with respect to which the similar American litigants may be their economic competitors." 4 International litigants using the discovery rules should not be permitted to employ the Evidence Convention"' or similar international agreements to "create obstacles to discovery by an adversary. In general, full discovery should be available equally against all." However, where limits on discovery are imposed by "public authority," that is, foreign governments, but not at the request of the international litigant, "accommodation may be necessary to reconcile the requirement of [Rule 26] that discovery be equitable to the obligations imposed by the treaty. '' 1 6 Thus, in a roundabout way, the Notes would urge treaty compliance, but only after making the broad-based statement for equality of treatment.
As in the case of the Rule 4(d) proposals, there were foreign government concerns over Rule 26. The principal issue was with respect to the Committee Notes, that provisions relating to discovery in foreign countries would be inconsistent with the Evidence Convention. The U.S. Justice Department believed that the change unnecessarily restricted discovery from foreign litigants and urged that the Rule not contain any language relating to foreign discovery. The result was that the Committee made minor changes in the text of the Rule and "more significant" amendments in the Notes that, at least in the Committee's view, represented "an appropriate balance between the competing considerations that affect foreign discovery." And as in the case of Rule 4, the Court returned the amendment for further consideration to the Judicial Conference.
Thus, the text of the Rule remained about the same.. in the Advisory Committee draft, but the Committee Notes included "significant changes" that reflect an "appropriate balance between the competing considerations that affect foreign discovery." 1 9
The new provision would apply only to discovery sought to be conducted within a country that is a treaty partner with the United States. It would not cover discovery requests "that a party subject to the power of the court provide in the United States," for example, answering interrogatories, appearing at a deposition, or producing documents in this country, from information that may be located abroad or derived from materials located abroad. The Notes caution that "nevertheless, in such situations, although not governed by the amendment to rule 26(a)(5), the court should consider, as part of its obligation to prevent discovery abuses involving foreign litigants, the availability and practicality of litigants, who could take advantage of broad U.S. discovery rules while asserting protections under a treaty or their own national laws. 121 The Notes then seem to authorize discovery that would break the laws of a foreign country under certain circumstances:
Indeed, the court is not precluded by the rule from authorizing use of discovery methods that may violate the laws of another country if necessary to assure that discovery is not inadequate or inequitable and if not prohibited by a treaty or convention with the United States. The court should however, exercise caution in ordering such discovery, particularly if the impediment to the discovery is imposed at the instance of the foreign authority, not at the request of the litigant or non-party from whom information is sought. Moreover, in deciding upon an appropriate sanction for failure to comply with an order for such discovery, the court should take into account the fact that non-compliance was motivated by the party's need to conform to the law of a foreign country.'
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In no case, however, could a court authorize discovery by means that are prohibited by a treaty between the United States and the targeted foreign country, "for the proscriptions of the treaty take precedence over these rules."'' The result of this could be said to be a supersession of the balancing process enunciated by the Court in Societe Internationale, 24 if taken literally. The comity factor would seem to disappear. On the other hand, the Evidence Convention and international agreements like it would be given absolute priority if the United States is a party, and if any discovery procedures are forbidden in the agreement.
The net result would perpetuate the Agrospatiale holding. If the Convention states a method of discovery, and if a court would hold that the Convention method would be "inadequate" because of foreign state prohibition, then resort to the Convention method would not be required." 2 This from Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting opinion is worth repeating:
Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-case comity analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked infrequently. I fear the Court's decision means that courts will resort unnecessarily to issuing discovery orders under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a raw exercise of their jurisdictional power to the detriment of the United States'[s] national and international interests. The Court's view of this country's international obligations is particularly unfortunate in a world in which regular commercial and legal channels loom ever more crucial. 126 The result has been that most courts have refused to require first use of the Convention. 12 7 By contrast, other states party to the Evidence Convention "have uniformly criticized the ... Agrospatiale holding and have viewed it as a failure by U.S. courts to honor treaty obligations assumed by the United States It would seem that the federal courts would inject themselves into the very kind of problem that they eschewed in the act of state cases, and in which they were involved through suggestions of immunity after the 1952 Tate letter. In each, Congress attempted to solve the problem. 13 1 As with the Rule 4(d) proposals, the Advisory Committee noted that if the Rule 26(a) amendment were disapproved, the rest of the Rule 26 amendments (for example, those requiring early disclosure of discoverable information) that have generated a firestorm of protests, could go forward.' 32 The Standing Committee has decided not to submit the proposal to the Court. As submitted to the Supreme Court, the costs provision for waiver of service in Rule 4(d) will not apply to litigation with a foreign party. Transnational litigants will also be able to use the alternative service methods in proposed Rule 4(f), an improvement on Rule 4(i). 4 ' Foreign-country discovery provisions in Rule 26(a) have disappeared, as has the Rule 28(b) provision for depositions in foreign nations.
Thus, the state of the law has returned to where it was before the 1989 proposals went to the Supreme Court, except for the waiver of service provision in Rule 4. As a result, "a lot of carrying on in high places" began. 4 142. A colleague has likened treaty negotiation and ratification to the mating of elephants: "A lot of carrying on in high places, Ind no one knows the result for at least 22 months." Perhaps the same could be said for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at least where international litigation issues are involved. of process and discovery, operate as they did before 1989. The only exceptions are the new waiver of service provision in Rule 4 and updates to reflect Convention practice. The first obligation for the courts is treaty compliance. 143 The Rules Enabling Act speaks of superseding "laws" in favor of the Civil Rules; 1 " it says nothing about superseding treaties. Unless the courts are willing to apply a strict later-in-time rule in the face of a contrary, but earlier, treaty norm, the treaty rules should govern, 145 particularly in view of the Supreme Court's cautious approach in applying the Civil Rules in domestic diversity cases" and its cautionary analysis in later-in-time situations involving prior treaties and later legislation.
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The federal courts should apply the balancing analysis only when a treaty does not govern a situation or when a treaty permits domestic court interpretation. Therefore, if the amendments to the Civil Rules, or the application or interpretation of them, are contradictory to U.S. treaty obligations, the treaty should govern. Treaty law is supreme on the public law plane'" and as a matter of domestic jurisprudence. If it is appropriate to manage international service of process or discovery by a balancing test, whether or not the Service or Evidence Conventions apply to the litigation, either for non-Convention litigation or within the Conventions' framework, should the test be articulated in federal legislation or in the Rules of Civil Procedure? Legislation binding on the federal and state courts' 50 has the advantage of national uniformity, and would tend to eliminate cases like Schlunk" 1 t by imposing a uniform national standard. On the other hand, Congress may have concerns more pressing than court procedure. If there is a need for amendment in the future, needed repairs to legislation may languish for years.
15 2 The rules amendment process is quicker (approximately two years) and allows for greater involvement on the part of scholars and practitioners who have expertise in civil procedure (even though their work is still subject to congressional oversight).' 5 3 The federal courts are perceived abroad as the national courts of the United States, 5 4 and most international litigation winds up there on account of the alienage or admiralty jurisdiction, or federal question coupled with the right of removal. Moreover, legislation, if applicable for both federal and state courts, has an all-or-nothing flavor to it; the Federal Rules can be used as an appropriate laboratory for change.
Any rules amendments, or any legislation, should be evenhanded in their application to domestic and foreign parties, unless there are special considerations, such as indigency or mariner status.' 55 Evenhandedness has been the policy underlying national-treatment clauses in bilateral agreements, as well as the policy of comity, both of which allow foreign nationals access to the courts on the same basis as U.S. citizens. 56 Evenhandedness should also be the policy in the context of service of process and discovery.
The federal courts should not be agents for foreign policy decisions, even indirectly through rules of procedure. Foreign policymaking is a role for Congress and the President. The reluctance of the courts to assume such a role is reflected in their deference to the executive on public-law issues, such as continued viability of a treaty under international law,' 57 refusal to entertain suits by unrecognized governments, 58 reluctance to entertain litigation charged with international sensitivity, 5 9 or their attempt to be evenhanded under announced executive policy." 6 Congress can legislate in the field, as it did in 1964 for service and evidence in international litigation,' 6 ' in 1976 for foreign sovereign immunity, 62 and in 1983 for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.163 If there is to be any picking and choosing of policy with respect to a whole class of litigants (non-U.S. defendants in transnational civil litigation in the federal courts), Congress should be the decisionmaker. The courts, employing the currently used factoral approach, can make individualized decisions on how (and whether) a foreign defendant should be served, discovered, deposed, or sanctioned for failure to comply with the rules." The proposed amendments to Rule 4 regarding waiver of service of process, even without the potential for costs assessment, and those for mail service, have the potential for intrusion, perhaps inadvertently, into the foreign policy process of the United States. As in the case of the discarded amendments for Rules 26 and 28, Rule 4 should be redrafted to take positive account of U.S. treaty obligations, other sources of international law, and the claims of other sovereign states.
The courts should not be in the business of promulgating rules of procedure which, in a given context, can intrude extensively into the realm of foreign relations, an arena that is primarily a presidential or congressional preserve under the Constitution. grounds as they apply to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Germany. The status of the Arbitration Convention, supra note 25, may be doubtful as it applies to the former Czechoslovakia, the former USSR, and the former Yugoslavia. 
